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Abstract
German military technology in World War II was among the best of the major warring
powers and in many cases it was the groundwork for postwar innovations that permanently
changed global warfare. Three of the most important projects undertaken, which were not only
German initiatives and therefore perhaps among the most valuable programs for both the major
Axis and Allied nations, include the rocket, jet, and nuclear programs. In Germany, each of
these technologies was given different levels of attention and met with varying degrees of
success in their development and application. By the end of the war, both rockets and jets had
been used in combat, but nuclear weapons, despite the work of some of the best nuclear scientists
in the world, never came to fruition. For each program, the level of success depended on several
different factors, such as how the war was going, the effect of Allied air raids, and Germany’s
industrial capacities. The course of the war in particular decided the extent of investment in each
project. It influenced those within research and industry with regard to lobbying for more
development support and also those in the Nazi military and leadership, who heeded such calls as
it became more and more difficult for the German military to win using conventional weapons
and tactics.
But Germany lost the war, which meant that none of these technological developments
achieved the desired goal. Not only that, but they also represent a ton of time, resources, and
manpower that were wasted instead of more practically applied to other military deficiencies,
such as the Air Force’s lack of longrange bombers. With all of this in mind, it begs the
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question: why were revolutionary technology projects given such high levels of priority and
attention? Moreover, how rational was it of those involved in the decisionmaking process in
German technological research and development to invest in these technologies? The clear,
presentday answer is that it was very irrational, given the many factors that inhibited the success
of the programs. However, the pressure of a possible, looming defeat in a World War might
explain why this modern conclusion would not have been as easy to reach during the war as it is
now.

4

Introduction

If one reads a text on investment strategy today, the standard piece of advice given is to
regularly review asset allocation in order to make sure the risk of investment is not
disproportionate to one’s capabilities. In Nazi Germany during World War II, the circumstances
of the war made such riskbenefit analyses almost nonexistent. Throughout the war, several big
projects to develop exotic weapons were provided the highest level of priority for a weapons
production program regardless of Germany’s actual ability to carry out these tasks. Rockets and
jets were two of the most wellknown programs, and the rocket development project was actually
Germany’s biggest weapons program in the entire war. In the prewar period both of these
technologies were constantly researched and experimented with, and they had the virtue of
peacetime to prevent damage to the efforts being made to produce results. But during the war
these technologies suffered from serious deficiencies that came about as a result of Germany
fighting a war that looked more and more like it would end in defeat for Germany every day.
Manpower dwindled because of a need for men at the front to hold off the advancing Allied
armies, thereby ruining the supply of skilled laborers in Germany. Resources were cut off with
each territory the Allies reclaimed, thus reducing the quantity and quality of materials needed for
such special weapons programs. And Allied air raids continuously pummeled German factories
and research sites, forcing these projects to be conducted in conditions that were not conducive
to massproduction. Before the war began, the Nazi leadership, specifically as a result of Hitler’s
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policies, based decisions on weapons development funding on an analysis of likely return on
investment to support its war aims. During the war, however, Hitler and his associates clung to
these prewar exotic projects despite the worsening condition of the war, which meant that other,
more practical weapons suffered from a lack of investment. The reliance placed upon rockets
and jets reflected a sense of desperation among German war leaders and at the same time a
complete lack of consideration for what was, realistically speaking, in the best interest of
Germany’s war effort at the time.
Throughout this thesis, three different exotic weapons projects will be examined: rockets,
jets, and nuclear weapons. Each one will not only support the idea that they were invested in
based on an analysis of return on investment, but also determine how rational that original
analysis was and how rational it was to continue investment as the war progressed. For each
example, a prewar history of the technology will be discussed, because in order to properly
assess the decisions made during the war to increase or decrease investment it is important to
understand how far along the technology was at the time the war began. Chapter I will discuss
rockets, for this was the most extensive, and perhaps most famous, futuristic weapons project
that Germany undertook. Chapter II will explore aviation as a whole in Germany before and
during the war in order to provide comparison points for understanding why jets were considered
a project worthy of investment. Chapter III will look at the nuclear weapons program,
specifically because it was the only one of the three that Germany ended up not investing in on
as large of a scale as the first two. Finally, Chapter IV will compare the conditions during the
war that did or did not justify investment in these programs, and will thereby provide a final
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analysis of the rationality of the decisions to support exotic weapons. In the end, this thesis will
prove that it made sense to invest in exotic weapons programs before the war began, but that it
was ignorance of the reality of the war that made continued and increased support for such
programs during the war a bad decision as far as Germany’s hopes of winning World War II
were concerned.

7

Chapter I: The German Rocket Program

Rocket Technology in the Interwar Period
Long before Wernher von Braun’s first great creation, the infamous V2 rocket and the
first intercontinental ballistic missile, crashed down in an explosion of death and destruction in
London in Autumn of 1944, the development of rocket technology had been a main focus for
many German scientists. In the Weimar Republic, during the interwar period, the prospect of
building rockets, which were at the time aimed towards flight into outer space, was an exciting
one, especially given that Germany did not have much to be proud of after the humiliation of
1

World War I. Rocket technology was not entirely new, and it was not solely created by the
Germans, but it was in Germany that the biggest push was made to turn the dreams of space
flight into reality. In June of 1927, the 
Verein für Raumschiffahrt 
(VfR), or the Society for Space
2

Travel, was formed, and it was this organization that eventually achieved some early effective
3

rocket launches. Efforts were even made to attract public interest in rockets, with famous
German director Fritz Lang releasing the film 
Frau im Mond
, which was based on a 1928 book
4

about a mission to the Moon, in 1929.

Michael J. Neufeld, “The guided missile and the Third Reich,” in 
Science, Technology, and National
Socialism
, eds. Monika Renneberg and Mark Walker (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 53.
2
“Highlights in German Rocket Development from 19271945”
http://history.msfc.nasa.gov/german/highlights.html (accessed November 16, 2015).
3
Neufeld, “The guided missile and the Third Reich,” 53.
4
Neufeld, “The guided missile and the Third Reich,” 53.
1
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During the first World War, Germany had been a leader in developing new military
technology that revolutionized warfare and helped define how the wars of the 20th century were
fought. After the war, some Germans continued to attempt to put their country on top when it
came to technological innovation. Despite the difficulties faced by early rocket scientists, such as
5

Hermann Oberth and Wernher von Braun, in successfully testing their inventions, the idea of
6

rockets as possible weapons attracted interest from the German military. In July of 1932, von
Braun, as part of the VfR, demonstrated the Mirak II rocket to the German Army, and the
7

following month the Army formally announced its work on a rocket development program. In
1933, Rudolf Nebel, a controversial yet important figure in the early German rocket programs,
had drawn up recommendations of possible uses for rockets, shown below in the copy of a
document from the archives of the Deutsches Museum in Munich.

5

Neufeld, “The guided missile and the Third Reich,” 56.
Neufeld, “The guided missile and the Third Reich,” 56.
7
“Highlights in German Rocket Development from 19271945”.
8
“Einsatzmöglichkeiten für RaketenTorpedos (Flüssigkeitsraketen)”
http://www.digipeer.de/index.php?id=316862868.
6
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The implementations listed in the document, which include defense against aircraft, attack
rockets of various sorts including gas and shrapnel rockets, and even manned rockettorpedoes,
were all designed to appeal to potential military investors. Even before the Nazi Party gained
much traction in Germany, technological developments and increase in production throughout
9

German industry were already being geared towards military applications. Despite the severe
restrictions imposed on Germany’s military capacities by the Allies at the end of World War I,
10

there was always a sense of “nationalism [and] a widespread belief in technological progress”

among Germans, and this did not cease to exist during the Weimar Era. However, the ideas put

9

Neufeld, “The guided missile and the Third Reich,” 56.
Michael J. Neufeld, “Weimar Culture and Futuristic Technology: The Rocketry and Spaceflight Fad in
Germany 19231933,” 
Technology and Culture
31 (1990), 725752
.
10

10

forth by people like Nebel proved to come the wrong time in German history. The Great
Depression had shifted popular focus from technology to a topic far more important to the
average German: survival. Nationalism was now no longer seen through the scope of pride
through industrial and technological success. Instead, it centered more around fury over
Germany’s desperate state and the feeling that this, too, was a result of the winning powers of
WWI’s mistreatment and exploitation of the German nation and its people. Nationalism for
many average Germans became bred from anger rather than pride. Soon enough, with the help
of the Nazi Party, rockets almost entirely ceased to be a part of German society. In 1933, not
long after the Depression hit, the Nazis took power, and “public experimentation with and
11 

discussion of rocketry were largely eliminated.”

Not only could Germans not afford to pay
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attention to this “fad” 
, but the German Army had for a while desired to eliminate all public
competition in the race to produce effective rockets, and now that the Nazis were in power it had
the government’s support in doing so.

Rockets Under the Nazis
While rockets were initially not a priority under the Nazis, there were Nazi military
officials who were involved in rocket development even before the 
Machtergreifung
, or seizure
of power. As was discussed earlier, the German Army had formally announced its rocket
development work in 1932. In 1929, though, General Karl Emil Becker, who was head of the
Heereswaffenamt
(HWA), or the Army Weapons Department, ballistics testing unit, expressed
11
12

Neufeld, “Weimar Culture and Futuristic Technology,” 725.
Neufeld, “Weimar Culture and Futuristic Technology,” 729.
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his interest in rocket technology and his belief that it would ultimately lead to a “devastating new
13 

secret weapon: the longrange, ballistic missile.”

It was he who received permission from the

Reichswehrministerium
, or Reich Ministry of Defense, to research rockets under an Army
program. The most notable figure of the Army’s involvement in rocket technology was,
however, Captain Walter Dornberger, a subordinate of General Becker’s.

14

An artillery officer

who had served in the First World War, Dornberger had been placed in charge of HWA rocket
15

studies and was one of the main proponents of using rockets as weapons. In 1930 he had
already begun looking at ways to use rockets, which were still being constructed with solid fuel
16

rather than liquid and therefore had a shorter range, as a sort of shortrange artillery; by 1932,
once the liquid rockets that members of the VfR had been developing showed far greater range
potential,

17 ,18 

19

he was recruiting VfR members to work for the HWA 
, specifically under the

Army Ordnance group. After the Nazis took power, he was the man responsible for catapulting
Germany’s rocket technology into a massive military undertaking and turning it into the program
that eventually produced the 
Vergeltungswaffe
, or Vengeance Weapon, and thereby truly
kickstart the rocket era. It is important to understand the way in which Dornberger achieved this,
because it shows the degree to which the Nazis became invested in rockets, and it helps address

Michael J. Neufeld, 
The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of Ballistic Missile Era
(New York: The Free Press, 1995), 82.
14
Clayton K.S. Chun, 
Thunder Over the Horizon: From V2 Rockets to Ballistic Missiles
(Praeger Security
International, 2006), 42; Neufeld, “The guided missile and the Third Reich,” 56.
15
“Highlights in German Rocket Development from 19271945”.
16
Chun, 
Thunder Over the Horizon
, 42.
17
“Der Raketenflug über 1000 km  technische Parameter” 
http://www.digipeer.de/index.php?id=330351697.
18
“Reichweiten und Flugzeiten von Raketentorpedos (Flüssigkeitsraketen)”
http://www.digipeer.de/index.php?id=371752204.
19
Chun, 
Thunder Over the Horizon
, 42.
13
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the aspect of priority, as far as German decisions regarding which projects to invest in are
concerned. Dornberger’s most important tactic was to link the rocket program with the
Luftwaffe
, the German Air Force, which was vastly powerful and resourcerich and had its own
20 

interest in rocket technology for use in aircraft.

The 
Luftwaffe
was run by Hermann Goering,

who was of course extremely close to Hitler, and this granted a degree of legitimacy to the
military rocket program and made it easier to push it as a project worthy of investment. By
declaring, after various other missiles had already been tested but were unsuccessful, like the A3
in 1936, that the next creation could be a longrange weapon, Dornberger was able to accelerate
the development. In 1936 he secured the support of General Werner von Fritsch, the then
CommanderinChief of the Army, after several rocket engine demonstrations designed to
21

present their potential as new, exotic weapons, and achieved ultimate success in his endeavors
with the construction of the research site at Peenemünde in 1937. The Peenemünde research site,
which was built by the 
Luftwaffe
and at which the V2 rocket was eventually created, was the
result of 
Luftwaffe
money and resources and Dornberger’s promise of the A4, the Vmodel
rocket that became the V2. Finally, on 3 October 1942, the first fully successful V2 test was
carried out, with the rocket flying 118 miles from the launch site at Peenemünde.

22

Over the

course of 5 years, from 1932 to 1937, Dornberger had managed to recruit Wernher von Braun for
the Army and to use him and his promising rocket technology to turn rocket research and
production into a joint Army and Air Force program that backed by many top military officials.

20

Neufeld, “The guided missile and the Third Reich,” 58.
Chun, 
Thunder Over the Horizon
, 43.
22
“Highlights in German Rocket Development from 19271945”.
21
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Five years later, there were nearly 6,000 employees in the development section of Peenemünde
23

alone, and one more year after that, in 1943, Hitler declared the V2 program to have the
highest military priority.

24

The transition from a fantastical idea to a core value of the overall

Nazi wartime strategy, military superiority through advanced technology, was complete.

MittelbauDora
An aspect to rocket development under the Nazis that made it unique was that it
incorporated the use of a concentration camp entirely for the purpose of building rockets.
MittelbauDora concentration camp, located in Nordhausen, in the center of Germany, was a
forced labor subcamp of Buchenwald concentration camp. After the heavy bombardment of the
Peenemünde site, the rocket program required a safer place to continue its work, and Mittelbau
was chosen as the new location for its preexisting tunnel system that dated back to the
25 

mid1930s.

The establishment of this camp and the Mittelwerk (which was the name of the

new factory) facilities that comprised the aboveandunderground production of the V1 and V2
rockets contains several important intricacies. First, of course, is the use of slave labor. When
Mittelbau was set up in summer of 1943, the German war industry was suffering from severe
labor shortages as a result of the worsening situation in the war; many more men had been sent to
the front to halt the Allied advances in North Africa, Italy, and on the Eastern Front. As a result,
Arthur Rudolph, who was the Chief Production Engineer at Peenemünde’s V2 assembly site,
Walter R. Dornberger, 
The German V2
,
Technology and Culture
4 (Johns Hopkins University Press,
1963), 393409;
Neufeld, “The guided missile and the Third Reich,” 58.

24
“Highlights in German Rocket Development from 19271945”.
25
P. Grigorieff, “The Mittelwerk/Mittelbau/Camp Dora Mittelbau GmbH  Mittelbau KZ”. V2 Rocket.com
http://www.v2rocket.com/start/chapters/mittel.html (accessed January 18, 2016).
23
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recommended the use of forced labor to cope with the lack of German workers.

At this point,

the German Army was desperate to field rockets in battle, and so Dornberger’s team was in a
rush to get rockets out of the prototype phase and into production. However, the required goal of
27

1,000 rockets a month was highly unlikely to be met without sufficient manpower. As such, a
few thousand prisoners were delivered to Peenemünde to work on the rocket program there.
When the switch was made to Mittelbau, SS Brigadier General Hans Kammler, the newly
appointed chief of the Mittelbau complex, requested prisoners from nearby Buchenwald, and the
SS delivered the first contingents on August 28, 1943.

28

These prisoners were no longer held at

Buchenwald, and the new camp set up at the Mittelbau factory to contain them was called Dora.
While forced labor was used in some other industrial projects like regular aircraft development
29

beginning already in 1939, the rocket program was the first exotic weapon initiative to be
undertaken with the help of this method. It thus relied on prisoners to help build an invention
that had not yet been perfected, which meant that chance of failure was not exactly lessened,
given that the rocket scientists themselves still had not figured everything out. This makes the
use of forced labor unique in the sense that the Army was settling for quantity, not quality.
By comparison, this was not the sort of strategy the military had in mind when using
forced labor at other work camps like Sachsenhausen, north of Berlin, where Heinkel planes
were built. In this example, it was at the time already clear how to build planes, and despite

Grigorieff, 
The Mittelwerk/Mittelbau/Camp Dora Mittelbau GmbH  Mittelbau KZ.
Adam Tooze, 
The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy
(Penguin,
2008).
28
Grigorieff, 
The Mittelwerk/Mittelbau/Camp Dora Mittelbau GmbH  Mittelbau KZ.
29
Yves Béon, 
Planet Dora: A Memoir of the Holocaust and the Birth of the Space Age,(Westview, 1997),
18.
26
27

15

inevitable sabotage attempts, the outcome was still that the Air Force had working planes it could
use (and repair, if something was wrong with them) to achieve its objectives. But the rockets
were different. The prisoners were instructed as to how to assemble them, but the results were
not good: the first three rockets delivered all suffered from “serious production defects,” and
even after production numbers hit the hundreds per month, there were still difficulties with
product quality, which resulted in “disastrous misfires both on the launching pads and in
30 

midair.”

Leaving aside the issue of the technology not yet being fully understood, the first

V2’s also contained more basic deficiencies, like “bad welds, soldering problems, and faulty
31 

parts.”

As a result, the laborers did not really have to sabotage anything, although there were

certainly attempts at that.

32

They just built broken weapons that would only in the wildest

dreams of the German military actually have an impact on the war.
A second intricacy of the creation of DoraMittelbau was the role the SS played in the
rocket program. The SS always spied on other governmental and military groups and sought to
control or monitor many aspects to the Nazi state, so it was not unusual that it attempted to dig
its way into the rocket program. From the beginning of the program, the SS was trying to involve
33

itself in minute ways. Wernher von Braun, for example, was a Major in the SS, having joined
as a Lieutenant in 1940 but having already attended the SS riding school in 1933. According to
an account he gave to the US Department of War in 1947, he had no alternative but to join if he
34 

wanted to avoid any hostilities between the SS and the Army over the rocket program.

With

Tooze, 
The Wages of Destruction.
Grigorieff, 
The Mittelwerk/Mittelbau/Camp Dora Mittelbau GmbH  Mittelbau KZ.
32
Grigorieff, 
The Mittelwerk/Mittelbau/Camp Dora Mittelbau GmbH  Mittelbau KZ;Béon, 
Planet Dora
, 132.
33
Michael J. Neufeld, 
Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War
(Vintage Books, 2008), 121.
34
Neufeld, 
Von Braun
, 120.
30
31
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the establishment of MittelbauDora, however, the SS received a very good opportunity to play
power politics with the Army over the rocket program. As was discussed earlier, the forced
laborers at the Mittelwerk were initially inmates from Buchenwald concentration camp, which
meant that they had been provided to the rocket program by the SS, as the SS ran the
concentration camps. And as was also noted, the new chief of the Mittelbau project was an SS
General, Brigadier General Kammler. It was not coincidence that an SS General was now in
charge, nor was it a coincidence that it was General Kammler. On August 18, 1943,
Reichsführer
of the SS Heinrich Himmler met with Hitler and then overtook command of V2
35

rocket production from Albert Speer before appointing Kammler as head at Mittelbau.
Kammler was the right choice in Himmler’s eyes for running a new camp because he was
previously in charge of organizing the extermination camps, and of building the gas chambers at
36 

Auschwitz, Majdanek, and Belzec.

37

Now the SS had not only a “‘finger in the pie’” but actual

authority at Mittelbau. It provided the workers for the rocket scientists, which meant that it
controlled and organized the program’s production capabilities as far as manpower was
concerned. Furthermore, MittelbauDora became larger and larger as the months passed on,
which required that the increasing number of inmates be organized and contained, just like at the
other camps. According to Yves Béon, a survivor of the MittelbauDora work camp, “between
the arrival of prisoners in September 1943 and the arrival of the American army in April 1945,
the slavelabor workforce of about 12,00015,000 men at Dora was replenished at least three or

Grigorieff, 
The Mittelwerk/Mittelbau/Camp Dora Mittelbau GmbH  Mittelbau KZ.
Grigorieff, 
The Mittelwerk/Mittelbau/Camp Dora Mittelbau GmbH  Mittelbau KZ.
37
Neufeld, 
Von Braun
, 121.
35
36
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four times due to the horrific death rate among the prisoners.”

38

With such a large workforce,

and with so many new inmates coming in to fill the spots of those murdered before them, the
camp had to be expanded and administered efficiently. Not only was the SS the default
organization to manage such a task, it was the only real option because Himmler was in charge
and would not have wanted or allowed anything else. Had there not been the quantity of labor
available to the rocket team that uniquely the SS had to offer, there would not have been
anywhere near the number of rockets that were eventually built (which was already not even
close to the expected tally). In fact, the SS’s direct involvement in the project, which spawned as
a result of the establishment of MittelbauDora, opened up organizational and managerial
reservoirs that enabled the rocket program to operate to a degree of effectiveness impressive for
the conditions under which it had to work. The creation of the massive tunnels and underground
factories at Mittelbau was thanks to “concrete, steel, and the wrecked lives of countless
39

prisoners” all provided by the SS. Through the way in which the SS wove itself into various
levels of the rocket program leadership and production, the SS forced the Army, specifically
Dornberger and his team, to cooperate, and it made the program entirely dependent upon its
willingness and ability to supply labor. MittelbauDora personified slave labor as a means of
achieving the end goal of a miracle weapon.

Béon, 
Planet Dora
, 19.
Michael Thad Allen, 
The Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps
(The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 212.
38
39
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The Rationality of Investing In Rockets
The question has to be asked: why did the German leadership choose to focus many of its
efforts on exotic weapons like rockets rather than address the simpler issues that faced it at the
time? The general answer is, as has been previously mentioned, that the Nazis believed that
quality, not quantity, of weapons technology was the best strategy to pursue in deciding the war
in Germany’s favor. However, in looking at the rationality of the decision to invest in the rocket
program, there are a few important factors to take into account.
First, there were certainly pressing issues that Germany never did address, such as the
lack of effective longrange bombers, and these are points of comparison in examining the
rationality of the decision to put so much work into an exotic weapons project instead of one
geared towards a fundamental strategic need. This particular example is an important one
because Germany’s aviation technology was very good anyway, so the concept of quality could
have been combined with quantity. It appears therefore that this was an oversight, a result of
poor judgment on the part of military officials. The Soviet war industry had been relocated to
the Ural Mountains upon Operation Barbarossa’s commencement in June of 1941, and it forever
remained out of range of German airfields in the Soviet Union. This was, of course, because the
German assault was eventually completely stopped, but another explanation for the lack of
development of a longrange bomber to cope with that challenge is that the German leadership
clearly assumed that the military would soon continue moving forward, thereby removing the
need for such planes. In addition, while prewar or earlywar circumstances, such as the invasion
of Poland, did not necessitate heavy bombers because the enemies Germany was fighting were

19

no match for their military strength and 
Blitzkrieg
strategy to begin with, this is not an excuse for
a lack of adaptation. The wartime context, namely that the objective of reaching Moscow before
the Winter of 1941 really set in had not at all been achieved, should have provided the Germans
with the sense that something should perhaps be done about the problem just in case the tide did
begin to turn against them in the end after all.
The second aspect also deals with the notion of misallocation of resources, but more so
with regard to the fact that despite the eventual success in building the longrange weapon whose
creation had been the sole objective of Peenemünde and all of Germany’s investment in rocket
technology, it was too little, too late. This is not necessarily a comment that can only be made
with the privilege of hindsight, rather one that can be made by judging Germany’s position in the
war at the time of the first successful V2 test and the eventual implementation of the rocket as a
weapon. It makes sense that prewar exotic weapons projects were not as high on the priority list
for Hitler, because, as was mentioned earlier, Germany’s first several enemies were all still using
technology and strategy from the First World War, or, like Czechoslovakia, not using any
strategy at all other than immediately signing annexation or surrender documents. However, if
40

the fact that the V2 was not considered a top priority until July of 1943, even once exotic
weapons did begin to play a role it was at the wrong time.
The first year of consistent Allied air raids on German factories was 1943, and in August
41

the British conducted a bombing mission on Peenemünde itself, forcing the whole program
underground. This caused the development process to become far more rushed than it already

40
41

“Highlights in German Rocket Development from 19271945”.
“Highlights in German Rocket Development from 19271945”.
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was, the thinking being that if the Germans were to have a chance at fighting back at the new
wave of Allied airpower they had to move quickly on the rockets. Furthermore, the V1’s and
V2’s were not even launched at enemy targets until September of 1944, three months after the
Allies had completed their invasion of Normandy and at a point when Germany was in nearly
full retreat on all fronts. As a result, the HWA spent years working on rockets that did not
receive production approval in time to change the course of the war. However, despite this
obviously frustrating conduct of the project, the blame for this really rests on Hitler, because it
was he who denied mass production requests until the Soviets had won at Stalingrad and the
Western Allies had expelled the Germans from most of North Africa.

42

Furthermore, Hitler had

taken command of the Army in December of 1941, ending the succession of artillery officers
who had commanded it for the previous 8 years of the Third Reich and thereby assuming
responsibility for all of its projects.

43

Finally, leaving aside the tide of war as far as combat is concerned, by 1943 there was a
problem with Germany’s emphasis on rocket production and the way in which priority was
assigned to various military projects. To begin with, Germany’s system of prioritization was
practically nonexistent. Every branch of the military considered the war an opportunity to run
44 

its own individual weapons programs and to make itself the best branch.

For example, even

though Dornberger wanted to access the resources of the 
Luftwaffe
and thereby fashion some
cooperation between the Army and the 
Luftwaffe
, in 1936 Air Force General Wolfram von

Neufeld, 
The Rocket and the Reich
, 169.
Neufeld, 
The Rocket and the Reich
, 53.
44
Michael J. Neufeld, “Hitler, the V2, and the Battle for Priority,” 
The Journal of Military History
57 (1993),
511538.
42
43
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Richthofen offered Army rocket scientists (like von Braun) 5 million Reichsmark for a 
Luftwaffe
rocket project, and the Army had to outbid them at 6 million to end the conflict.

45

There was

also very poor communication between those in charge of military industrial production, such as
Fritz Todt and General Georg Thomas, and those actually conducting the war, such as Hermann
Goering (who was directly connected to industry through his Four Year Plan but was also the
46

CommanderinChief of the 
Luftwaffe
). Furthermore, while high priority was first assigned to
the rocket program in 1943, as was mentioned earlier, the order for mass production of the V2
rocket was given by Hitler in December of 1942, just under two months before the total collapse
and surrender of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad.
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To give the order to start mass producing a

product that is not yet considered to be at the highest priority (which was the only level of
priority that warranted full investment and mass production at this point in the war) does not
really make sense. It demonstrates a degree of irrationality, perhaps even desperation, that
should not have been playing a role in this sort of project. It was irrational because the rocket
program was not at high priority status, which meant that it was not yet receiving the funds and
effort that high priority status guaranteed. At the same time, it was expected that the rocket
program could commence mass production, which it obviously could not realistically do if it did
not have the resources it required. The decision was a desperate one because it came at a time
when the German plan of action, which was to outdo its enemies with the supposedly superior
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technology it already possessed, was being proven not only ineffective but in fact detrimental to
the German war cause. At this point, Hitler had to turn to an exotic weapon because he could no
longer rely on the conventional warfare that had guaranteed the German military so much
success in the first few years of the war.
Not only was there a problem with the logic of such a strategy, but there was also the
issue of how feasible implementing it was. The reality of the state of the rocket program was
clearly either underestimated or not accepted, and this was another problem with the decisions
made in the last months of 1942 and the first months of 1943. The effect of the confusion and
hesitance on the rocket program was serious: the problems it faced ran much deeper than just that
it had not had the assistance it needed. Firstly, Dr. Walter Thiel, another of the leading scientists
in Dornberger’s rocket program and a close associate of von Braun’s, declared in August of 1943
that not only did the deficiencies of the A4 rocket preclude it from massproduction, but that the
engineers working on it did not even know yet how to turn it into something more than a
48 

prototype.

As such, “under accelerated delivery schedules of 1943,” the only rocket engine
49 

ready for production was a “monstrosity and a plumber’s nightmare.”

In addition, as was

discussed earlier, the Allied air raids on German factories became commonplace in this year.
This meant that Dornberger, Army Ordnance, and the HWA now tried to operate an underfunded
project on an accelerated time schedule in the face of continuous bombing missions aimed
specifically at destroying the entire Peenemünde facility, at which this already complicated
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struggle was taking place. In a further blow to the rocket development efforts, on August 17,
1943, Dr. Walter Thiel was killed in a bombing raid carried out by the British. Thiel was a
brilliant scientist responsible for major performance improvements to the A4 engine after his
50

transfer to Dornberger’s group in 1936, and his was a significant loss to the team at
Peenemünde.
As far as actual production results are concerned, it appears that those officers and
leaders requesting, or rather demanding, rockets for battle use were completely ignorant of the
fact that given the state of the program there was no way they would get what they wanted. It is
unlikely that these people were under the impression that the rocket project faced no real
difficulties and was only slow in providing results because it was not yet expected to do so.
Instead, they were uninformed and just did not want to hear excuses and only cared about the
fact that rockets were a supposed to be capable of “devastating” the enemy.
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An example of this

involves 
Generaloberst
(Colonel General) Friedrich Fromm, the Chief of the Office of Army
Armament and the Replacement Army (which was set up as a result of Operation Barbarossa
stalling at the end of 1941). On October 19, 1943, after Mittelbau GmbH was set up as part of
MittelbauDora concentration camp in September, Fromm ordered 12,000 V2 rockets to be
built, at a rate of 900 per month.
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By the end of the war, Minister of Armaments and War
53 

Production Albert Speer’s figures counted 5,951.

It cannot be that Fromm was so naïve that he

figured that his order for 12,000 rockets would go through. It is that he either must not have
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been aware (most likely by choice) that there was only one type of engine ready for use and that
it was only at the prototype stage, or that he did not care and wanted the scientists to figure some
solution out despite that. Clearly, as soon as the war began to fall apart for Germany, the rocket
program’s chances of developing into something that would change the outcome of the war, or
even the situation for Germany on the Eastern Front (since that was the most pressing issue at the
time that it was assigned high priority) were doomed. Poor communication mixed with the hasty
manner in which the rocket program was pushed along could not possibly, and in the end never
did, allow for consistently coordinated planning and prioritization between the German
leadership and industry managers, and was one reason for the failure of the rocket program to
really play a vital role in the war.
The German rocket program was, on the whole, a brilliant idea that paved the way to
space flight after the war ended in 1945. However, as far as whether or not it was actually wise
of the HWA, of Hitler, and of all those who relented to Dornberger’s insistence on their support,
most notably to put so much effort into this program is concerned, it can be concluded that it
absolutely was a serious misallocation of valuable military resources that could have, had they
been used elsewhere, had the desired effect of turning the war, or keeping it, in Germany’s favor.
The rockets Germany had succeeded in building were, as has been discussed, longrange
weapons, and there was never any emphasis placed on smaller, short distance rockets. It makes
sense that the short distance rockets were not part of the Army Ordnance development plans
because, as was discussed earlier, the Germans were not fighting enemies where rockets could
have played a pivotal role for Germany, and therefore the more exotic, larger rocket could be the

25

main focus. As a result, however, the German product was not as battlefield applicable when the
time finally came for this new technology to do what Hitler and all of the Generals who had
agreed to fund and support the rocket program were so adamant it do: play a decisive role in
combat. By comparison, the Soviet Union had been able to create smaller rockets, the famous
Katyusha launchers, that were much easier to mass produce.
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From the start, or in 1936, when

Walter Dornberger promised the A4 ballistic missile, what was eventually called the
Wunderwaffe
, or Wonder Weapon, by Hitler, the German rocket program was under pressure to
create a viable weapon in an unrealistic period of time.
The overall issue is that while it made sense on the one hand for the Germans to build
something revolutionary that no one could compete with, it only made sense while Germany was
winning the war, which is to say at a time when Germany did not need new weapons. In this
sense, it was rational for Germany to invest so heavily in such a project. Once Germany began
losing, though, building something revolutionary for the sake of competition or achievement was
no longer the objective. Instead, it was to produce a decisive weapon that would turn the tide
back in Germany’s favor. However, because the tables turned before that revolutionary weapon
could be finished, it meant that everything regarding the project had to be changed to fit with the
new circumstances. The development schedule had to be sped up, the shortage of manpower had
to be compensated for by bringing in foreign workers and prisoners from concentration camps
like DoraMittelbau, the products that were available were not the best, and in the end the
German Army did not even effectively use what it had worked on for so long. This is when all
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rationality disappears, and the focus can be placed on German failure. In this sense, the term
“German” can be used when referring to the failure because it covers such a broad spectrum of
players upon whom this failure can rest. Hitler was at the top of this chain, but it ran all the way
down through Albert Speer and his Ministry of Armaments and War, through the
Heereswaffenamt
and the many Generals who assessed the various weapons programs, through
the commanders who ordered more rockets than could possibly be produced, through those who
backed Dornberger at the beginning, and even to Dornberger himself. It is true that the goal of
building the ballistic missile as a weapon was achieved, but that was all. The purpose of
achieving this goal was never even in sight, and if the situation is looked at in that way, it must
be thought that the 
Heereswaffenamt
should have realized this and turned their attention to easier
and more practical applications that could have actually influenced the war.
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Chapter II: Aviation in Nazi Germany

World War I
In July of 1917, Manfred von Richthofen, the World War I pilot known as the Red Baron
and the most successful ace of the war, took to the skies in the Fokker Dr. I triplane for the first
time. The Dr. I was the exotic result of the 
Luftstreitskräfte
, or Air Force’s, attempts to achieve
air superiority in the war over the trenches of the Western Front, and it was the plane with which
the Red Baron famously became associated. In July of 1944, the German Air Force, this time
known as the 
Luftwaffe
, also found itself struggling to regain air superiority against the Allies,
and it, too, turned to an exotic weapon to save Germany. The result was the Messerschmitt
Me262, the world’s first operational jet aircraft. As in the case of the First World War,
however, it was too little, too late.
World War I was an industrial and technological competition as much as it was an actual
war, and among its defining features was the newest dimension to warfare: aerial combat. As a
result, it offered the world’s leading industrial powers, and those rapidly advancing through
industrialization, like the Soviet Union, an opportunity to explore the new technology of
airplanes. In Germany in particular, interest in aviation was not limited to industry, but existed
in the highest ranks of the German military leadership, starting all the way at the top with
55 

General Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff.
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combustion engine for an airplane was introduced only a few years before the war began, and it
was immediately pounced upon by military industry. Although the 
Luftstreitskräfte
were not
officially established until 1916, initiatives led by military men like Quartermaster General Erich
Ludendorff and Captain (later General) Hermann von der LiethThomsen, who served under
56

Ludendorff as Chief of Field Aviation and later as the Chief of Staff of the 
Luftstreitskräfte
,
helped cultivate the aviation industry’s military applications. The Wright Brothers themselves
had set up a company in Germany and by the time the war broke out there were almost a dozen
57

different German aircraft manufacturers, several of which became the brains behind such
famous planes as the Dr. I and the Albatross D. VII.
However, despite Germany industry’s initial eagerness in the effort to play a part in
aviation in World War I (which may in part be explained by the fact that everyone saw the war
as an impending and inevitable event), by the time the von Schlieffen plan fully failed and the
trenches stretched hundreds of miles, the industry had been crippled by the Allied blockade and
Germany’s limited access to natural resources.
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To make matters worse, German aerodromes,

factories, and fighter aircraft airfields themselves were targeted by the Western Allies through
the innovative technique of strategic bombing.

59

Under this sort of pressure, German industry

had no chance of matching Allied production figures. To give a sense of this capability gap,
France, for example, began the war with 138 frontline aircraft, and finished it with 4,500.
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Germany began with 232 and finished with 2,390.

Not only did Germany end its war with

more than 2,000 fewer combat planes than France, but it also lost over 20,000 of the 48,537
aircraft it had built in total throughout the entire war.
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Given that Germany was not able to

outmanufacture the Allies, the military had to try to outperform its adversaries, and the
Luftstreitskräfte
played a key role in attempting to restore control over the tide of the war to
Germany. The fighter aircraft were built to be more agile and more nimble than the Allied
equivalents, as the Fokker Dr. I demonstrated, and Germany boasted some of the most successful
aces of the war, most notably the Red Baron. Not only that, but newer fighter planes that were
able to outfly their opponents were used in an early form of 
Blitzkrieg
during the last major
offensive in 1918.
For all the success the Air Force perceived in its fight against the increasingly powerful
Allies, however, it ended up just not quite being enough. The problem was just that: the Allies
were increasingly powerful, and the best pilots and the best planes, the latter of which Germany
did not fully possess, were not going to change that. In the capacity of attacking Allied defenses
as part of the 1918 offensive, the 
Luftstreitskräfte
still suffered from high casualty rates, with
oneseventh of the pilot force lost every month; the Army, which was conducting this ground
offensive, did not even really benefit from the Air Force efforts: it lost one million men.
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Finally, when the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919, the 
Luftstreitskräfte
was dissolved and
Germany was prohibited from future production of military aircraft. Aviation, while a new and
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exciting technology, did not play a decisive role in determining the outcome of the war. Perhaps
it required further experimentation in strategic applications and perhaps the technology needed to
continue to be improved upon, but at this point airplanes were not what won or lost wars, they
were just a new way of fighting.

Aviation Between the Wars
After World War I, the industrial aspect to aviation faced an uncertain fate. The German
aviation industry had developed during the war into an economic sector of great importance,

63

but because there was no longer a military need (by mandate of the Treaty of Versailles, of
course) for airplanes this sector virtually collapsed. However, aviation technology could
naturally be used for civilian purposes as well, and it was precisely this application that the
industry was determined to adopt in order to save itself. The new government ushered in by the
revolution that occurred in November of 1918 was a pacifist one, and thus supported the idea of
a civilian use for flight and was against the idea of violating the Treaty of Versailles and
attempting to restore the now under strength military’s air wing. Under the leadership of August
Euler, an aviation industrialist whom the new government trusted because of his outspoken
disapproval of the militarization of aviation before the war, the new society of aviation was to
include the elements of the government, civilian air groups, the science and technology world,
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and Germany’s industry in creating a civilian air industry that could compete with those
belonging to the major players on the international stage.
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In the Weimar Republic, civilian air industry was a booming success. The industry was
65

recording revenues of 100 million Reichsmark per year, and the 1920s were a decade of
realizing the potential of aviation for commercial purposes. After Charles Lindbergh completed
his Transatlantic flight from New York to Paris in May of 1927, it was clear that aviation was
taking on a technologically revolutionary importance akin to that of the steam engine one century
66 

prior.

By the end of the decade, the 
Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft für Luft( und Raum)fahrt

(WGL), or the Scientific Society for Air and Space Travel, which was established in 1914 and
was one of Germany’s premier aviation research groups, had over 800 members and even
included names such as Hugo Junkers, the founder of the major aircraft manufacturer Junkers
AG, and Claude Dornier, the founder of another important German aircraft company, Dornier
Flugzeugwerke.
The time came, however, when the German people viewed the success of American and
other industrialized nations’ aviation efforts, such as Lindbergh’s flight, as an indication that
Germany was behind in the competition to be at the forefront of aviation innovation. Not only
was the general public under this impression, but it was within the most important circles of
67 

German aviation organizations that concern over this was expressed.

It appeared that the
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government was at fault for this slowdown. A memorandum from the head of the 
Deutsche
Forschungsrat für Luftfahrt
(DFL), or German Aviation Research Council, Ludwig Prandtl, to
the 
Reichsverkehrsminister
, the Reich Minister of Transportation, Theodor von Guérard,
indicated the opinion of the Council:
Unfortunately it is not at all clear to those in the politically responsible circles of
Germany that the great efforts abroad, through the construction of new, big test
facilities, and the allocation of substantial funds for purely research and
development purposes, give rise to the danger that German aviation research will
68

fall very far behind in competition with that occurring abroad.

Not only were the politicians to whom Prandtl was referring responsible, but so were the ever
declining economic conditions. Prandtl noted in this same letter:
The Göttingen Laboratory for Aerodynamics, for example, which in the
immediate postwar period was considered across the world as a leader, can no
longer maintain the competition against foreign countries in certain very
important spheres. The German Laboratory for Aviation, which with its facilities
was exemplary before the war, is also suffering seriously from scarcity of certain
modern facilities and testing means.
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The end of the 1920s marked the beginning of a shift in the use of aircraft technology in
Germany, something which was spurred on by the Great Depression. This unprecedented
economic crisis helped remind Germans of the humiliation the Treaty of Versailles caused, and it
is safe to say that the nationalist fervor brewing in Germany throughout the 20s certainly
received a boost from the disastrous effects of the economic collapse. The eventual result of the
anger and desperation over Germany’s disparate situation was, of course, the seizure of power by
Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in 1933. As regards flight, it was the Nazis’ aim to seize the
potential that aviation research had shown and been unable to cultivate in the interwar period and
to put Germany back at the forefront of this technology. Aviation was thus no longer a civilian
hobby and a peaceful source of revenue for industry and the economy, it was now a major
component to the remilitarization of Germany.

The Establishment of the Luftwaffe and the Revitalization of Aviation Industry
The Nazis’ rearming of Germany included the establishment of an Air Force, which
became known as the 
Luftwaffe
. The 
Luftstreitskräfte
were dissolved under the terms of the
Treaty of Versailles, and during the Weimar era there had not been a lot of opportunity to train
military pilots. Under the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo with the USSR, the 
Reichswehr
, which
constituted Germany’s military (
Reichswehr
translates to “Reich Defense”) in the Weimar era,
set up a pilot training facility in Lipetsk, approximately 220 miles southeast of Moscow.
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However, in the entire eight year existence of the Lipetsk facility, which was shut down by Hitler
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71

after his rise to power in 1933, only 100 fighter pilots had been successfully trained, which
would have been considered a negligible number as far as German ambitions were concerned.
On the other hand, aircraft industry made leaps and bounds under the Nazis because of Hitler’s
disregard for the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that specifically limited things like German
industrial capacity and rearmament.
As was mentioned earlier, the civilian aviation industry had initially been very successful
in Weimar Germany, but both the victorious powers of World War I and the Weimar government
played a role in limiting the degree of this success. Clauses included in the Treaty of Versailles
and in postwar documents severely limited what Germany could build, and the government was
not inclined to disobey them. Not only did the Treaty of Versailles initially prohibit aircraft
72

manufacturing of any sort, but in 1922, once that prohibition expired, the Allies laid out further
73 

limitations that met 1916era capabilities.

Furthermore, the Weimar government sought to be

involved in aircraft industry in an advisory and oversight sense, and this was part of what made it
difficult to produce many superior or more advanced airplanes.
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The government did not offer

enough resources to the various aviation research organizations (not that it was in a position to
provide many funds anyway), leaving little in the way of opportunity for modern German
aviation research, let alone production. In the eyes of those attempting to lead Germany into a
new era of aviation, such as the DFL, this was a seriously important issue that failed to be
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addressed.

In the terrible economic conditions of the Great Depression, Germany aviation

industry was seriously underperforming: in 1933, it increased its production from 1932 by only
76

59%, and all of the models produced that year were the same as the ones from the year before.

Hitler’s first year in power, however, was all about centralizing or nationalizing industry
and preparing the conditions within Germany that would enable massive militaryindustrial
77 

production.

As aviation was a big focus of the Nazi military reconstruction, it was in 1933 that

the 
Reichsluftfahrtministerium
(RLM), or Reich Aviation Ministry, was established with
Hermann Göring at the helm as Minister of Aviation. After the Army aviation wing was
transferred to the RLM in May of 1933, the 
Luftwaffe
was established because aviation was
considered by many in the German military to be very important in modern and future warfare
and therefore worthy of its own branch.
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If there was to be an Air Force, however, there had to be the industry to build it. Within
the first year of Hitler’s rule, the aviation industry had been revived; new companies were
established, old ones were increased in size, and by the end of 1933 “two million workers were
employed on airfield and factory construction.”
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In 1934, after France, which was among the

countries Hitler informed that year about the creation of the new Air Force, broke off discussions
when Hitler presented the details of the size of the 
Luftwaffe
, the plan to drastically increase
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military aircraft production was fully put into action. Outrageous as it was for Germany to
80

declare its intention to rearm itself, which was highly supported by the German public, the plan,
drafted by Secretary of State for Aviation 
Generalmajor
(Major General) Erhard Milch,
81

specified that there were to be 4,000 new airplanes by October 1, 1935.

The Rationality of Investing in Jet Aircraft
Strategy and the Rationality of Investing in Jets
Despite the research on and the development of jet engines and aircraft that occurred
before and during the war, the first jet plane, the Messerschmitt Me262, did not fly in combat
82 

until July of 1944.

By that time the Allies commanded air superiority, they were continuously

bombing German factories, and they were producing more planes overall than the Germans did,
and when the war ended 10 months later, somewhere between only 1,200 and 1,500 Me262’s
had been built.
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Even if the war had lasted another two or three months, the production numbers

were simply far too few to compete with Allied industrial and tactical capabilities, even if the
Allies did not have jets. If the jets were built in relatively small numbers and had no impact on
the war, then was it really worth all of the time, money, and resources that were poured into this
effort? From a postwar point of view it is clear that the jet program was a waste of the
Luftwaffe’s
efforts and that the jet proved to be nothing more (during the war, at least) than an
impressive technological feat. However, in order to understand why it was a waste of time it is
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necessary to take into account the actual time period in which the decisionmakers were
operating, and in doing so to examine several important components to this conclusion: first,
why the 
Luftwaffe
was so invested in the jet program; second, the strategic thinking that drove
investment in jets; and third, why the jet program failed, thereby answering whether or not it
made sense for the Germans to invest in it.
Before the war, the German military was free to explore the increasingly advancing field
of battlefield technology as Germany was experiencing economic improvement under the new
Nazi regime and there was at this point no war going on that demanded that attention be paid to
84

certain sectors rather than others. On the contrary, the military was preparing for war, which
meant that its goal was to find the best tools with which to win the war quickly and effectively.
At the same time, however, it was filled with another purpose: to redeem Germany as an
innovative arena.
As was discussed earlier, despite Germany’s initial success in commercial aviation after
World War I, the aviation industry was still seriously limited by Allied restrictions, and the
struggling economy made it difficult to put the research that was done to the test. Now,
85

however, the 
Luftwaffe
was to be a key component to Germany’s future battle strategies, most
famously 
Blitzkrieg
, and as such it required planes and technology that would be superior to any
enemies’. The result of 
Luftwaffe’s
work was famous planes like the Messerschmitt Bf109, the
FockeWulf 190, and the Junkers Ju87, the plane that carried out the dreaded Stuka attacks. In
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the early phases of the war, none of Germany’s adversaries could match the quality of such
aircraft or skill of the German pilots who flew them. But this was an anticipated fact on the part
of German war planners, and that is why programs on more revolutionary technology, like the jet
one, received attention. Such projects were initially aimed at demonstrating German
innovation’s prowess and cementing its glory. It was not until later that they took on a new role,
one of devastating Germany’s enemies in a way that would reverse the course of the war; in
other words, a last gasp to save Germany from defeat.
The second part of explaining the rationality of investing in the jet program is how jets
were implemented during the war. This aspect revolves the strategic role of aviation that
German leaders took into consideration when examining various technologies. The state of the
war at any given time determined the necessity of a technology, and as long as the war was going
in Germany’s favor, there was no need to speed up production or build any special weapons. By
contrast, when the tide began to turn, strategy might logically have shifted to seeking out new
ways of defeating the enemy, because the current methods and weapons available were not
proving successful. Men like Erhard Milch, who as Secretary of State for Aviation had given
support to the Heinkel and Messerschmitt companies in their experimental jet projects, Hermann
Göring, who as head of the RLM passed down orders that controlled and changed the focus of
production, or even Hitler himself, upon whom the ultimate decisions regarding the worthiness
of a certain project or rested, all viewed jet development in the context of necessity.
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This way

39

of looking at things (in either the positive or negative phases of the war) made sense from a
political or strategic standpoint.
However, seeing everything in the scope of the time period is exactly what led to a big
disconnect between two separate sectors of German military aviation: bombers and fighter
aircraft, and jets. As was mentioned earlier, the whole reason an Air Force was created was
because aviation was seen as an extremely important feature of modern warfare. Of course, with
new technology comes new strategy, and this led to several important tactical proposals both
before and during the war. In 1933, Robert Knauss, who was a close friend of Erhard Milch,
proposed the creation of a 400strong bomber fleet that would be used to wipe out the industries
of who he perceived to be Germany’s most threatening adversaries at the time, which included
87 

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and most notably France.

However, despite agreeing with Knauss’s

belief in the need for a bomber force, Colonel Walter Wever, the chief of the 
Luftkommandoamt
,
or Air Command Office, of the RLM, felt that the real enemy was the Soviet Union. This
difference in opinion is actually huge, because the quality of the opponents mentioned was
drastically different and the strategic approach against them could therefore be very different.
The Soviet Union was in the midst of an industrial boom, churning out 160 bombers in 1933 and
88

almost twice that the next year, whereas Poland, for example, still had biplanes from World
War I as the main aircraft of its Air Force. Moreover, Wever held this belief because it was what
Hitler declared in 
Mein Kampf
; he therefore desired 10,000 aircraft of all sorts to be produced.
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For the German aviation industry, it was an opportunity for various aircraft companies to seize
upon the need for bombers and win the contract to produce them. Colonel Wilhelm Wimmer, a
former WWI pilot who agreed with Wever’s view, became head of the RLM’s 
Technisches Amt
,
or Technical Office, in 1933 and placed orders with Dornier and Junkers for longrange bombers.
90

He and Wever then approved of the proposed Dornier Do17 and Junkers Ju89 designs.

Despite how clear it was to some strategists in the 
Luftwaffe
that bombers were crucial to
winning whichever war would soon come, in the end it turned out that these aircraft played a
serious role in the calamitous downfall of the 
Luftwaffe
. The strategy that those who supported
the production of bombers had in mind did not line up with the reality of the situation. As
described above, Wever and Wimmer believed the true enemy to be the USSR, and because the
Soviet Union’s main industrial plants were in the Ural Mountains, which were 2,500 kilometers
away from Germany, it was absolutely essential to have aircraft that could fly such distances and
destroy the factories. The problem was that they, despite being chiefs of two of the research and
development branches of the RLM, were clearly not as wellinformed about Hitler’s plans for
91

war as they thought. They did not expect the war to start until 1942 at the earliest, which meant
that there would be plenty of time for the Do19 and the Ju89 to be developed and perfected. Of
course, the war started in 1939, and the Soviet Union, Wever and Wimmer’s main concern, was
invaded in 1941.
Although this demonstrates a serious disconnect between the highest level of German
leadership and those who were there to make Hitler’s plans possible, it is also understandable
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because Hitler was not necessarily going to share his plan with a couple of Colonels. The serious
disconnect that this does demonstrate, however, is between Göring (the head of the RLM) and
his subordinates Wever, Wimmer, and even Erhard Milch, who was tasked with actually
organizing the production of everything. In April of 1936, Wimmer, along with Adolf
Baeumker, an advisory minister in the 
Reichswehrministerium
, or Reich Ministry of Defense,
92

presented to Göring the proposal for an academy for aviation research; one month earlier,
Generalingenieur, or Engineer General, Roluf Lucht of the RLM wrote to the most important
members of the economic group of aviation industry that there needed to be greater cooperation
between research and industry and as much emphasis placed on research as possible before the
93 

impending war.

While research leaders were busy offering ideas for how to improve German

research capabilities, Göring did not provide them with an understanding of the true timeline that
might have caused them to make do with what was available to them at the time and accelerate
production. Had this happened, perhaps the Do17 and Ju89 would have been ready to bomb
the Urals in 1941.
In 1933, jet engines were not being built. The technology was being researched, but at
this point jets were not (and obviously could not be) considered the crux of the 
Luftwaffe
’s
aviation tactics. But if the discrepancies in bomber strategies had existed beginning in the early
1930s, well before the war began, why would the 
Luftwaffe
, once the war started, maintain its
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focus on accelerating jet development instead of solve the problems facing the longrange
bombers? To a certain extent, this can be blamed on the fact that most German commanders
assumed the war would be a very quick one and that the bombers would not be needed; after all,
Operation Barbarossa aimed to take over Moscow, which would have meant the capitulation of
the Soviet Union and therefore removed the need for longrange bombers that could reach the
Urals. This would thus have allowed jets to be more of a leisurely experiment than a wartime
requirement. However, another answer is that by 1941, the circumstances of the war pretty much
made the investment in the jet program a necessity. Inconsistencies in Germany’s war plan,
often created by Hitler’s tinkering and whimsical desires, virtually required the continued
development of a jet 
Wunderwaffe
just in case things went wrong.
A good example of one of these strategic inconsistencies is the objective of aviation
industry’s in what it was producing before the war. As was mentioned earlier, the 
Luftwaffe’s
goal was to build aircraft superior to those of its enemies in order to make the aerial component
to the battle plan as successful and effective as possible. It is true that improved industrial
94

capacities had allowed aircraft to become massproduced as early as 1934, but that only made
sense given that the industry had simply grown and that many previously unemployed workers
were now being used in aviation. However, in 1940, the policy changed: Hitler issued an order
that all projects that would not produce operational aircraft within 612 months were to be
95 

terminated.
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In 1941, in another 
Führerprotokoll
, or 
Führer
decree, he reduced the time to 6
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months.

This was because he now wanted the focus of the aviation industry to be on producing

as many aircraft as possible, regardless of quality. Experimentation on jets, which still had a
long way to go, was therefore banned. However, Erhard Milch, along with other researchers,
must have understood that there was a possibility that the war might drag on, because in the same
year he ignored Hitler and issued an order that encouraged Heinkel and Messerschmitt’s jet
projects.

97

Experimentation therefore continued, and that is why Messerschmitt was able to

present a prototype Me262 to Hitler in 1943.
Strategic coordination with regard to which projects deserved certain attention was
therefore disastrous and involved subordinates of Göring and Hitler disobeying the two leaders.
Not only did the bomber strategy that men like Knauss, Wever, and Wimmer had emphasized
before the war fall apart in the face of a lack of bombers once Operation Barbarossa began, but
important leaders in the 
Luftwaffe
ended up disagreeing with the strategy as well and saw the
jets, once their existence became known, as being completely misused. General Adolf Galland,
one of the most famous German aces of the war, considered Hitler’s insistence on the Me262
being a bomber instead of a fighter to be a waste of an opportunity to fight back against the
98 

increasingly dominating Allied air forces.

He repeatedly advised Hitler, beginning in 1942,
99

that he should focus on “building a massive jetfighter force” and believed that many more
Me262’s could have been produced if they were designated for fighter design rather than

96

Pavelec, “The German Jet Program 19391945,” 10.
Pavelec, “The German Jet Program 19391945,” 10.
98
Adolf Galland, “Interview With World War II 
Luftwaffe
General and Ace Pilot Adolf Galland,” interview by
Colin D. Heaton. 
World War II,January 1997 (accessed 18 February 2016)
http://www.historynet.com/interviewwithworldwariiluftwaffegeneralandacepilotadolfgalland.htm.
99
Adolf Galland, “Interview With World War II 
Luftwaffe
General and Ace Pilot Adolf Galland”
97

44

bomber. In the end, although projects on jets did receive more investment and were given
priority of raw materials and resources under Milch’s 1941 order, the result was, of course, that
the first one was not sent into combat until 1944. Theoretically, it did make sense for the
Luftwaffe
to keep up its jet program; at least there was a jet plane that Hitler believed could be a
bomber. Realistically, however, the strategic mess that was Germany’s aerial warfare plan
meant that it was also a waste of time and valuable resources that could have been used
elsewhere.
The final important aspect to address is why the jet program failed to produce the
aviation 
Wunderwaffe
Hitler had hoped for. Despite the logic of the previously discussed
approach of acting based upon the circumstances of the current situation, there was a massive
problem with this. While leaders like Hitler and Göring considered jets in the context of the war,
they did not view jets in the context of capability. Capability does not refer in this case to the
skill of German pilots or the number available to actually fly the planes. It is true that at the end
of the war there were very few pilots left, let alone skilled ones, but the jet program did not
suffer from this shortage. Instead, the pilots who were selected to fly the Me262 once it became
available for combat use were among the best fighter and bomber pilots Germany had.
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This

did leave the other air force units undermanned and with inexperienced pilots, and it is worthy of
note because it clearly indicates that Hitler, who had eventually taken virtually all strategic
decisions upon himself because he did not trust his Generals, believed the jet would be the thing
to at least reclaim air superiority, if not also save the whole war effort. Capability instead means
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Germany’s actual industrial ability to manufacture jet planes. There were two main reasons why
the jet program failed: first, that Germany lacked the resources to mass produce jet aircraft, and
that as a result of the lack of resources the jets themselves were far too primitive to be relied
upon to change the outcome of the war, as Hitler hoped they would; and second, that the Allies
obliterated German industry and commanded such superior production output that they rendered
the jets as obsolete as Germany’s conventional aircraft.
In December of 1936, Albert Betz of the German Aerodynamic Laboratory wrote to
Göring to outline the need for great investment to be made in 
Luftwaffe
research institutes and in
the acquisition of raw materials that could sustain the mass production of aircraft throughout the
war, whenever it finally came. He stressed that it was important for the 
Luftwaffe
to not lag
behind its enemies by developing during the war rather than before it, like what had happened in
World War I.
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Betz’s concerns were not unfounded: even in 1938, just one year before the war

began, Germany “was almost completely deficient in 20 out of 26 strategic materials,” such as
bauxite and copper.

102 

It was crucial for Germany to access and obtain as many of these

resources as possible before the war, and this was a success: certain resources, in particular fuel,
were imported from the Soviet Union during the period of nonaggression before 1941.
But again, that was before the war and for the first two years of it, when things were
going well. Once Germany began losing, many crucial raw materials became inaccessible, both
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as a result of the Allied blockade and the fact that many of Germany’s enemies (or countries it
had occupied and then lost) were the main producers of such materials. This meant that
Germany’s industrial programs as a whole had to rely on what had been stockpiled rather than
what could consistently be brought into the country. In particular, this was disastrous for jet
production, because resources such as nickel, chrome, titanium, and molybdenum (not to
mention aluminum, for the airframe), which were crucial to jet engines were not produced in
Germany.

103

In addition, even though over 1,000 Me262’s were indeed built before the war

ended, they suffered from serious design issues that had mostly to do with their engines. The
engine was of course the core of the airplane, and without it the mass production of quality
engines there could be no mass production of the plane itself. Not only did the lack of raw
materials influence the ability to produce large quantities of jets, and it also affected the quality
104 

of the engines. The Me262 engine, built by Junkers, had a lifespan of about 10 hours,

which

was abysmal, and this was a result of the lack of necessary materials for which Germany had no
substitute. As a result, scarce resources became even more unavailable as the war progressed,
meaning that the jet program was essentially doomed from the moment that it became clear that
Germany would lose the war. Despite all of this, however, the order was still given out to mass
produce the Me262. Germany’s industrial state rendered this task impossible, yet Hitler and
Göring did not care. False promises to Hitler from Göring
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unwilling to see the reality of the situation, and that those in charge of the jet project, and
Luftwaffe
development programs all across the board, were forced to produce ends without a
means.
The other significant blow to the jet program was that the Allies continuously bombed
German industrial locations, often focusing specifically on jet manufacturing plants, and that the
Allies could outdo Germany’s production ability on a massive scale. As was noted earlier, the
Allies blockaded Germany and thereby cut off its access to key raw materials. Even if the
blockade had not existed, the United Kingdom and the United States themselves were also the
106 

main producers of such materials,

and because Germany was fighting them, there was no way

they would be able to import anything from them. With regard to bombing raids, the major
British and American air raids began in 1943, and no time was wasted in targeting the sources of
Germany’s exotic weapons. On 17 August, 1943, the US 8th Air Force hit the Messerschmitt
plant in Regensburg, and much of the aircraft manufacturing equipment was destroyed; in 1945,
when the Germans truly could not afford to lose anymore facilities, the US 491st Bombardment
107 

Group struck the Neuburg jet plant on 19 March and destroyed it.

On the Neuburg mission,
108

which involved a target of high priority for the Germans, not a single American plane was lost;
with its country’s industry crippled, there was no way the 
Luftwaffe
would be able to field

enough airplanes to threaten the Allies’ domination of the skies. Not only were the Allies able to
maintain air superiority, but they prevented the Germans from even being able to challenge them.
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A lack of materials, a crippled industry, and an overpowering enemy were the reasons
why once the jet program was thrown into full swing and its results were sent into battle it failed
to alter the outcome of the war. However, it should have been Göring and Hitler’s understanding
that Germany was at a significant industrial disadvantage and that as a result, the jet was not to
be relied upon as a 
Wunderwaffe
that would turn the tide of the war in Germany’s favor. In the
case of the jet aircraft, the poor leadership of Göring and Hitler contributed to the failure of the
program to not only change the outcome of the war, but even have an effect on the situation into
which its products were thrust. They judged the need for various types of aircraft was based on
how the war was going on the battlefield, and they wrongly judged the actual ability to make
those kinds of planes based on the same criteria.
Germany’s success with aviation in World War II was an astounding feat for a country
that was, until a few years before the war began, deep in a depression and under the shackles of
the Treaty of Versailles. Despite the difficulties it faced and its obvious status as a follower in
the world of aviation, German aviation industry was able in a very short amount of time to make
itself one of the best in the world. Even though factories in Germany in 1945 were being hit
harder than ever by Allied air raids, German aircraft manufacturers were still churning out
several thousand fighter planes a month, which was more than at any point in the war prior.
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Its legacy is also undeniable: the Messerschmitt Bf109 and FockeWulf Fw190 were two of the
most wellknown aircraft of the war, and the 
Luftwaffe
’s pilots were among the very best not
only in the war but in aerial combat history. The top three aces of the war were all German and
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they combined for a total of 927 victories, and all three survived the war; furthermore,
110 

approximately 2,500 German pilots achieved ace status during the war.

However, the prowess

of the fighter pilots and the impressive industrial output of fighter aircraft only mattered while
the war was going Germany’s way. By 1942, victory began to slip out of Germany’s grasp; the
Luftwaffe
started to experience serious fuel shortages at the Battle of Stalingrad, so no matter
how good the German pilots were, they were no use if they could not actually fly their planes.
The eventual destruction of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, the opening of a second front
with the Allied invasion of Sicily, and the defeat in the Battle of Kursk in 1943 all but ensured
that the war would end with an Allied victory.
It is clear that only a miracle could have saved Germany, but it is also clear that jets were
not that miracle. As was explained, the poor strategic implementation of the jets that were built,
the lack of raw materials, and the extreme superiority of Allied industry all made a reliable
Luftwaffe
jet wing wishful thinking. Jets were, as a result, a serious misuse of resources,
manpower, and valuable time that Germany could not afford to waste. But at the same time, one
has to consider the thinking at the time of those involved in making the decision to produce a jet
plane. Aircraft manufacturers promised whatever the 
Luftwaffe
or Hitler wanted because they
were motivated by a desire to receive the government contract for a product. This is exemplified
by Willy Messerschmitt’s plans for the Me262 to be a bomber because that was Hitler’s wish.
Everyone in the development program and the 
Luftwaffe
, such as Adolf Galland, knew it was
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best suited to be a fighter. But in order to ensure the acquisition of the materials necessary to
bring his blueprints to life, Messerschmitt tailored it to what Hitler wanted rather than what
tacticians like Galland felt was needed. From the points of view of firms like Messerschmitt,
Heinkel, and Arado then, it was always a good idea to invest in jets. The German military and
the Nazi leadership itself faced a serious dilemma: in 1943, Germany was clearly losing the war,
so the options available were either to surrender or keep fighting. From the strategic, military
(and perhaps lessideologicallycharged) perspective, continuing the fight meant avoiding
Germany’s complete destruction and coming to some sort of reasonable agreement with the
Allies. From the leadership perspective, however, Hitler and his closest associates in Göring,
Himmler, Speer, Goebbels, and so forth did not consider surrender an option and viewed the
continuation of the fight as simply a delay of the final victory. In their eyes, therefore, if jets
were what would help stop that delay then they were what Germany needed. However, while
Hitler and his entourage were definitely desperate for the weapons that would outdo their
enemies, even in 1943 they still believed that Germany would win the war. This is perhaps why
they were convinced that a 
Wunderwaffe
would actually work, and what motivated Hitler to
approve and support the Me262 and other jet programs.
As though history had planned it, the special airplane of the 
Luftwaffe
in World War II
was sent into combat in the secondtolast year of the war, just like the special airplane of the
Luftstreitskräfte
was deployed for the first time in the secondtolast year of World War I. In
WWII, the 
Luftwaffe
hoped the jet engines of the Me262 would destroy the Allied bomber fleets
and restore German air superiority over Western Europe. In World War I, the 
Luftstreitskräfte
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figured the Fokker Dr. I would outmaneuver and outfly its Allied counterparts and allow the
German Army to break the stalemate on the ground. In both cases, the two Air Forces were
relying on innovative technology at the wrong time.
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Chapter III: Nuclear Weapons in Nazi Germany

The Development of the Nuclear Weapon
Nuclear fission was discovered in December of 1938 by German chemist Otto Hahn, who
in 1944 received the Nobel Prize for this work, and Austrian physicist Lise Meitner, who was
Jewish and fled Germany just before the discovery was confirmed and did not share the Nobel
Prize with Hahn. Fission was a huge discovery, as it is the basis for the chain reaction needed to
cause a nuclear explosion. This detail of fission being discovered in Germany is quite important
when it comes to assessing Nazi Germany’s involvement in the race for the nuclear weapon
during World War II. If it was in Germany that the breakthrough discovery in nuclear science
was made (nuclear fission), why did Germany not build an atomic weapon?
Before World War II, the atomic bomb was just a concept. Already in 1933, before
nuclear fission was discovered, Hungarian scientist Leó Szilárd proposed the idea of a nuclear
chain reaction to produce an explosion; the only question was how to achieve that. At this time,
however, the science for nuclear weapons was not very well understood, and the arrival of World
War II only reduced the collaboration between the worldwide scientific community. Eventually,
it was really each country (and their allies) for themselves in terms of figuring out how to apply
nuclear fission to making a bomb, once that became the intended objective of achieving fission.
At the same time that this science was still being understood, its potential for military application
was certainly realized by several important scientists, such as Albert Einstein and Leo Szilárd,
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who fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s.

Of course, during the war the military use of nuclear

technology became a competition between enemies; Walther Gerlach, the physicist in charge of
German uranium research for the final year and a half of the war, told his superiors that “the
man who could threaten use of the bomb would be able to achieve anything.”

112 

However,

despite the knowledge that a nuclear weapon was a possibility, in the early stages of the war the
atomic bomb was really a hypothetical rather than a reality. The countries involved in the war
could initially not realistically rely on nuclear weapons as instruments of war precisely because
nuclear warfare was a new type of warfare that would have to first be invented; until that point,
the war would have to be fought using the traditional methods. But while eventually nuclear
weapons did become a reality that shaped the outcome of the war, there was no German atomic
bomb during World War II. Clearly for Germany the bomb remained a hypothetical or at least
faroff accomplishment throughout the whole of the war.

Why There Was No German Nuclear Weapon
The reason why Germany did not build a bomb can be summed up by referencing a
meeting between Werner Heisenberg and Albert Speer in 1942, where he convinced Speer that
German physicists felt that the effort to build an atomic bomb was “too big, too expensive, and
too uncertain” because “[German scientists] lacked experience.”
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Heisenberg was pretty much
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the leading authority in Nazi Germany on nuclear physics, having won the Nobel Prize in 1932
for creating quantum mechanics. Moreover, he was also one of the most important leaders of the
Uranverein
, or Uranium Club, which was created shortly after the discovery of nuclear fission
and was the German Army Ordnance Group’s secret nuclear weapons development project. As a
result of his assessment to Speer that it would take years for Germany to achieve an atomic bomb
(which was reinforced by other physicists’ impressions that it would be three or four years before
anything of value came to be), the nuclear weapons program was assigned continued yet minimal
funding.
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The answer is more complex than just that, however. There are several basic factors that
explain why Germany got to the point where a nuclear weapon was considered out of reach.
First, there was the fundamental flaw of Nazi Germany that was persecution. This is not a
critique of how to run a dictatorship, but the fact is that many of the brilliant minds who could
have contributed to nuclear weapons research fled either Germany or its fascist allies before the
115 

war began because they were being persecuted.

Albert Einstein was probably the most famous

of these cases, but he was one of many, such as Enrico Fermi, who was forced to leave Italy
because its antiJewish laws affected his wife. As a result, Germany in essence enabled some of
the men who were most capable of the kind of work involved in developing a bomb to join the
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Allies and work against Germany. This had certain important implications. The racial purity
laws affected around a quarter German physicists, greatly reducing university faculties and
sending an endless list of now famous minds to Britain and the United States.
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When it came to

nuclear weapons research, 
Uranverein
scientists sometimes struggled with certain aspects (such
as how to explode a plutonium bomb), while Manhattan Project scientists like Enrico Fermi or
Hans Bethe were able to solve such dilemmas.
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This is not to say that German scientists could

not have eventually resolved their shortcomings, it just means that the discriminatory laws made
the task more difficult than it needed to be.
In addition to this, the constant possibility of being drafted into the military worked
against effective research and development processes. The need for men at the front meant that
selection was indiscriminatory, which it really should not have been. Paul Müller, for example,
was one of CarlFriedrich von Weizsäcker’s students and a leader of the theoretical research on
the use of plutonium under von Weizsäcker. In 1941 he was drafted, and later on killed in action
118 

on the Eastern Front.

Von Weizsäcker himself, along with Paul Harteck, was drafted into the

military and only had his service requirement revoked because Heisenberg pulled some strings.
Not only was the draft policy an oversight, but it also scared some scientists into feeling that
although they had perhaps not been called up because of their profession, if they produced work
that was irrelevant to the war effort that exemption would be cancelled out and they would be
sent to the front.
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Furthermore, ideology drove practically all of Hitler’s policies. This meant that there
was limited academic freedom and science was essentially poisoned by the influence of scientists
who subscribed to the Nazi ideology, such as 1920 Nobel Prize winning physicist Philipp
Lenard, whom Hitler very much respected, and Theodor Vahlen, who was made president of the
119 

Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1938.

By contrast, in Weimar Germany, theoretical physics

had thrived in a period of intellectual freedom and the absence of resources to fund experimental
physics, and the country was the pilgrimage destination of many foreign physicists, such as J.
Robert Oppenheimer.
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As was mentioned above, nuclear physics research suffered from the

Gleichschaltung
, which was the Nazi policy that forced every part of German society to follow
Nazi ideology. Not only were the actually capable scientists replaced and managed by fanatics,
but the Farm Hall transcripts indicate that many of the German scientists feared they would be
121 

punished for any failure.

As far as the more specific arena of working on a nuclear weapon

was concerned, the project was plagued by Gestapo and SS surveillance,

122 

just like other exotic

weapons programs. As such, the expectation of results in a sense ominously hung over the
researchers. After the war, Heisenberg himself thought that even if German scientists had
wanted to work on an atomic bomb the constant state surveillance would have made it a very
difficult process.
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When taking all of these factors into account, it is clear that certain conditions for a
successful and fullon nuclear weapons program were not present. Again, Germany still
possessed the scientific minds capable of building an atomic bomb, but so much more of a
burden was placed on them by the reduction of the physicist population. The replacement of
prominent, influential minds with diehard Nazis also hampered cooperation with the government
124 

on a nuclear program.

Furthermore, as was shown earlier, although the nuclear program was

not considered 
kriegsentscheidend
, or wardeciding, and thus did not receive the funding that
befitted a program that was expected to produce a useful result within the timeframe of the war,
the threat of the Nazi regime clearly never left the minds of the scientists involved. In
comparison with the Manhattan Project then, the German scientists were at a disadvantage. The
way everything was organized was not conducive to a focused effort. However, the
aforementioned factors were actually only half of the situation, and they did not carry such
weight that they alone excluded the possibility of a nuclear program. Heisenberg did not cite a
lack of scientists or a disapproval of the leadership when he informed Speer that a bomb could
not be built. Instead, he felt it was because the science was still evolving and they needed more
time to figure out how to develop a bomb. As such, the real reason why Germany did not built
an atomic bomb had much more to do with the latter fact than the Nazis’ ruined society and
flawed systems.

The Rationality of Not Investing In Nuclear Weapons
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The question now is whether it was in the end the right choice not to invest in a nuclear
program despite the fact that Heisenberg and the other German nuclear scientists were capable of
building an atomic bomb. As has been made clear, Heisenberg declared in 1942 that the
possibility of an atomic device was several years away at the earliest. While this explains why
there was no bomb, it was also the allimportant motivator for Hitler when it came to considering
whether or not to turn nuclear research into a fullscale, industrialsized endeavor. By 1941, the
Uranverein
research efforts did not lag behind the American ones; both groups of scientists were
125 

achieving similarly important discoveries at that time.

However, whereas in the American

case the results were presented as being worthy of further investment from the government,
which was of course received, the German scientists interpreted their achievements as indicators
that a nuclear weapon was still a long way away. In a sense, they were modest in appraising the
importance of their work. Precisely this fork in the road to the nuclear bomb created the
conditions for the American weapon and the lack of a German one. When it was clear to the
Americans that they were making progress in their research, the effort to build a nuclear weapon
became a race against the Germans. After all, it was in Germany that nuclear fission was
discovered, so it was only reasonable to assume, no matter what the intelligence reports
indicated,
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that they were hard at work on building a bomb. This attitude also justifies the

sabotage aerial bombardment of the Norwegian heavy water plant upon which the nuclear
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program so heavily relied. The timing of all of this is very important. In October of 1941, when
the US government threw its full support behind nuclear weapons,

127 

the Wehrmacht was only

just encountering the harsh Russian weather. Other than that, the war was going very smoothly
and victory did not seem far off.
With this in mind, one can return to the question: if German nuclear scientists were
capable of building a bomb, why was the switch from modest funding to massive research and
development not made? If the end result would come only once the war was over, all the more
reason to just go for the really challenging, innovative projects. The German military did not
need nuclear weapons to win its current war because it was all going so well; by this standard, it
could afford to prepare for the future by allocating resources to a nuclear program. Hitler,
however, was only interested in weapons projects that would provide a result during the
timeframe of the war. Not only that, but he believed the war would end in a German victory.
This meant that all serious weapons projects worth investing in should be producing something
that would help guarantee victory. Rockets and jets, for example, were two new technologies
with high potential for serious impact in the war. More importantly, these technologies had
actual examples that could be demonstrated to Hitler; therefore, they were given a lot of
attention.

128

To say that Hitler wanted weapons that would be ready for use before the war ended does
not, of course, mean that he knew when the war would end. But as was mentioned, the war was
going very well in 1941, and even in Summer of 1942 things were still looking good. This was
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around the time when the consideration of investing in nuclear weapons could be made, and
based on the course of the war Hitler certainly was not under the impression that the war would
finish as late as 1945 or 1946 (which was three or four years from the time of Speer’s meeting
129 

with Heisenberg). Thus Hitler, while interested in nuclear weapons,

he did not see such a

program as 
kriegsentscheidend
or even 
kriegswichtig
, a lower degree of priority that meant
“important for the war.” Albert Speer still offered the Heisenberg and his colleagues his support
and some funding, but the result of the decision to delay the production of a bomb for after the
war, when there would be peace and time to freely do so, the German nuclear research program
became essentially a hobby, with more pragmatic, everyday uses

130 

as the fruits of the scientists’

labors.
By 1943, exotic weapons had become Hitler’s solution to turning the tide back in
Germany’s favor. The Red Army had won in Stalingrad in February of that year and claimed
another huge victory at Kursk in the Summer, and was pushing the Wehrmacht back towards
Germany. But by the time the first rockets were fired at England and the first fighter jets flew
over the Western Front, it was out of the question to add the atom bomb back to the list of exotic
weapons Germany might use to win the war. Allied bombing raids were wreaking havoc on
German industry every single day, and now the fact that the scientists were some of the best in
the world was irrelevant. Germany no longer had the industrial capacity to sustain its
conventional war efforts, let alone something as complicated and vast as a nuclear program. For
example, imports from Portugal of wolframite, a key component in ammunition production, were
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cut off in 1943, and uranium ore (which should have been being used for the nuclear program)
had to replace it.
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In 1945, Walther Gerlach detailed a status report of nuclear research in

Germany. The analysis not only declined to mention nuclear technology for military purposes,
but it said that despite intellectual ability and the numerous successes of atomic research, the lack
of resources was being a massive hindrance to the process.
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As a result of all of this, there just

was no way Germany was going to build an atomic bomb. While German scientists had viewed
the nuclear weapon as an eventual goal to be worked towards, the United States had seen it as a
necessity, or by German standards, 
kriegsentscheidend
.
In the end, however, the decisions made by Hitler and Speer to interpret the assessments
of Heisenberg and his colleagues as a sign to put off nuclear weapons until after the war was won
not only made complete sense given the time period but were the right choices to make. As was
explained earlier, all of this has to do with when the option to go forward with a major nuclear
program or not was presented. In 1941, there was no need for massive resources to be spent on
something that, based on the information present at the time, still contained a lot of uncertainty.
Germany had won all of its battles and was looking to be on its way to defeating its biggest
enemy, the Soviet Union. As such, the small expenditure in military spending requested by
133 

Heisenberg at the time

was totally reasonable and proved enough to achieve modest yet
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important results throughout the war.
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Furthermore, while Heisenberg recognized that
135

eventually there would come a time when the technology for nuclear weapons was figured out,
if the Germans were not that far, then there was no way the Americans were. Obviously, this
arrogance had its consequences, but just like there was no way for Hitler to know Germany

would start losing the war, there was no way for Heisenberg to have known at the time just how
wrong he was.
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Chapter IV: Comparing Failure Through the Lens of Rationality

The Prelude to the War
In comparing the rationality of investing or not investing in these three innovative
military technologies, there are several important aspects to keep in mind: first, the prewar
history of each one; second, the need for and availability of materials during the war; third, the
level of understanding of each technology; and fourth, the way in which each project was
managed. These aspects all played into the final decisions that were made regarding investment
in each program, and they help explain whether or not these decisions were rational.
The preWorldWarII history of the three programs is very important because it
influenced the ability of the proponents of each one to make a case for their technology. Rockets
and jets, for example, both had results to show for their research. During the interwar period
rocket technology was a fad that did not attract investment from the Weimar government. But
rocket technology was already being tinkered with in the mid 1920s, which meant that by the
time the war arrived in 1939 there had been over a decade of work done on them. Furthermore,
the German Army was interested in rockets even before the Nazis took power in 1933, which
meant that while there was not a significant amount of resources poured into rockets (because
Germany, struggling through the Great Depression, could not afford to do so), the researchers
had the backing of the Army to achieve success. Despite the effects of the Great Depression, this
period of research and development did produced actual rockets, even if they were still
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rudimentary. Once the Nazis seized power and the military took over all rocket research, what
had already been achieved was demonstrated to the military. The case was then made for the use
of the rocket as a military weapon, and eventually this culminated in a massive rocket program
136 

that was Germany’s biggest military project throughout the war.

In the buildup to the war,

however, Hitler and the German military were not looking for technologies that were way ahead
of the time. The thinking at that point was that the weapons available to them at the present (or
that were quickly being updated and improved every year in preparation for the impending war)
would combine with 
Blitzkrieg
strategy to defeat the weaker enemies after whom Germany
would initially go. However, despite this, the rocket program retained its government and
military support precisely because it was clearly making steps forward and that it was clear that a
weapon of great potential would come of it. Had there not been so much work done by
individual researchers and enthusiast groups, such as the VfR, in Weimar Germany the rocket
program would not have received the degree of investment that it did under the Nazis.
Similarly to the rocket program, aviation had an extensive prewar history. While jets
themselves were not developed until during the war, they already had an industry that was
clearly changing the face of the world behind them. Airplanes were used in World War I as a
temporary weapon, they were an entirely new aspect to warfare that everyone involved, both
military and industry, knew would define the 20th century. This precedent meant that jets were
simply the next step in aviation, just like the monoplanes that most countries created in the
postWWI era were the successors to the biplanes used during the war. In fact, given how old
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aviation was by the time World War II began, jet planes actually had a longer history of research
and development behind them than rockets. Throughout the interwar period, German industry
was motivated by the ignominious defeat in World War I and the rotten deal that was the Treaty
of Versailles to regain its position as one of the leaders in innovative military technology. Given,
however, the pacifism and insistence on adherence to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles on the
part of the Weimar German government, aviation development was almost entirely limited to
civilian purposes. The Treaty not only dissolved the 
Luftstreitskräfte
but also prohibited
Germany from having an Air Force at all, and the Weimar government had no intention to defy
this. This meant that German aircraft manufacturers had to shift their focus towards the
commercial aspect to aviation. As was just explained, however, everyone knew that aviation
was changing the way people lived, and German aircraft manufacturers certainly wanted to play
their part, even if it was just in the civilian sector that they could do so. Because of the new role
aviation took on in the world, this technology gained far more attention than rockets did, and this
attention came from all areas of society.
A big difference between aviation and rocketry in Weimar Germany, from the civilian
perspective, was that even though fantastical films were made about rockets and it was the dream
of rocket scientists, for example, to go into outer space, in the end this was all just dreaming.
There was not actually anything to really make Germans feel like rockets were going to become
the new civilian technology of the future. That is why rocketry in Weimar Germany is really
best described as it has been, as a fad. It is also why the only people who picked up on its
potential were the military. But airplanes, on the other hand, had already proven their worth in
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World War I and they were something that everyone could essentially understand and relate to;
not everyone could afford to fly commercially, but they still knew that flight was the future of
mass transportation. The fact that this was so big for average people is important when looking
at why the Nazis pursued aviation innovation once they seized power. As was mentioned earlier,
the Treaty of Versailles had banned Germany from having an Air Force. It only made sense for
the Nazis to pick up on aviation as a rallying point for public support, both before and after
Hitler rose to power. Hitler’s main promise was that he would redeem Germany, and he could
use the reestablishment of the Air Force and the development of impressive new planes as a way
to assure people Germany would exact its revenge.
Like rockets, jets were worked on in the prewar era, and were in fact essentially the Air
Force’s response to the Army’s rocket program. Where the creation of aviation itself
revolutionized warfare, jet engines were seen as revolutionizing aviation. This meant that when
the time finally came to propose a plane for production, the justification for its creation was that
the jet technology existed and could be used for a plane and so all that was left was for the plane
to be built. The problem, of course, was that while jet research and development was underway
before the war, like rockets jets were not what Germany needed at the time. Poland, the invasion
of which marked the beginning of World War II, had an Air Force that was still equipped with
biplanes. These aircraft were no match for German monoplanes, let alone a jet. After all, even
without jets, the Germans fielded planes that became some of the most famous combat aircraft in
history. However, for understanding how all of this impacts the rationality of the later decision
to invest in a fullfledged jet program, there are is an important implication that the existence of a

67

prewar jet program had for Germany: it meant that by the time the war was underway, thanks to
the research and development that had already been done the option of a jet plane was always
there.
Nuclear weapons are the outlier of the three technologies when it comes to prewar
history. The prewar history of nuclear science and nuclear weapons is limited almost entirely to
theory, and this was theory that existed and evolved over the course of only about four or five
years before 1939. When compared to rockets and jets, the biggest difference is that unlike the
other two technologies, there was nothing to show for all of the research that had been done
before the war began. Obviously, this isn’t to say that German nuclear science research was a
failure before the war; it just points out the fact that German nuclear scientists had much less
time to work than the rocket and jet scientists and engineers. In fact, as was explained, even
though nuclear explosions were theorized in 1934, nuclear fission was not discovered until 1938,
which meant that as far as building a bomb was concerned, there was only about a year between
the major discovery that made a bomb possible and the outbreak of war. In this sense, the
prewar history of nuclear weapons is actually very important to determining the rationality of
the decision not to invest in them because it fits with Hitler’s standards for supporting certain
new technologies. These standards included that there had to be a guarantee of a product that
would affect the war if the program were to receive support, and since the possibility of nuclear
weapons was so new, there was, in the eyes of German scientists, no way to make that guarantee.
Under no circumstances could anyone expect the technology that was just discovered to provide
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more results within the timeframe of the war than the ones that had already been worked on for
many years beforehand.

Materials
In order to actually produce any of these weapons, Germany required important things
like raw materials and manpower, access to which was contingent upon how well the war was
going. In the case of each program, the effects of the Allied air raids and the gradual reduction
of territory under German control played a big role in hampering their success. As far as rockets
are concerned, the fact that they were the biggest program eventually meant that they were no
secret to the Allies. To begin with, the Allies put German rocket production sites among their
targets once heaving air raids began in 1943. The most notable effect of is this is the destruction
of the Peenemünde research facility, as this incident is what forced the rocket program
underground. Furthermore, in 1943 the Germany began losing a lot of ground, and new fronts
opened up that stretched the German military increasingly thin. Although the metal and iron ore
deposits in the Ukraine were still under German control in 1943,
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this territory was eventually

recaptured by the Soviet Union, which meant that the supply of materials key to programs like
rockets was cut off. Leaving this lack of raw materials aside, in order to cope with the heavy
losses suffered at the front, as many German males as possible were thrown into the service. The
shortage of manpower in Germany that resulted from this ended up placing the construction of
rockets in part in the hands of concentration camp prisoners recruited to perform slave labor.
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Not only was there a risk that the prisoners would commit sabotage, but they were also using
poor materials to build technologically flawed devices.
All of this is of course the downside to the rocket program’s need for important raw
materials, and in Hitler’s defense, since it was he who ordered the rocket program to be
considered high priority as far as weapons projects were concerned, he thought that Germany
would still win the war and that rockets were what would help this goal be achieved. Also, he
assigned high priority in 1943, in which year, as was just mentioned, the German military still
controlled important foreign iron and metal deposits. So from that standpoint, it made sense to
give the program everything. But at the same time, the need for such materials also makes his
decision irrational. Instead of focusing on ways to improve upon the currently failings of the
military, he threw his support behind an audacious program that relied upon the war to keep
going Germany’s way in order for it to succeed, something which was definitely not happening
in 1943.
The jet program suffered from raw material scarcity probably most notably of the three
technologies because of just how many different raw materials were needed to build jets and
airplanes. When examining the list of the most important raw materials for any country during
the war for armaments production purposes, Germany had virtually none of them within the
borders of the country itself.
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This meant that the jet program’s success relied heavily upon the

ability to import materials like bauxite and copper (to name a few), and it also meant that once
these imports were no longer possible because Germany was losing the war, substitutes had to be
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used that were not as good as what was actually required. The main issue with the jet program
was that the jet engines themselves were often deficient, and this was the result of a lack of the
materials needed to build good engines. Allied air campaigns targeted Germany’s raw materials
reserves and supplies down to the very smallest ones; for example, the imports of wolframite
needed to produce bullets were cut off in 1943.
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If there was a reliance on imports just to make

bullets, then there was certainly no way this same reliance could be expected to maintain a
successful jet program. In this sense, there was clearly a lack of understanding, or an
unwillingness to accept the reality of the situation, when it came to supporting the production of
the Messerschmitt Me262 fighter jet (among others) in 1943. And perhaps there was the same
desire to ignore the situation on the part of the aircraft companies fighting for contracts. As
Willy Messerschmitt’s guarantee to Hitler that the Me262 would be a bomber shows, the
manufacturers all wanted their individual plans for a jet to be approved and supported, and so
they promised whatever they could in order to get what they needed.
Nuclear weapons were not actually put into production, but there were still two valuable
components that would have been crucial to a possible weapons program. First, there was
uranium, significant deposits of which were in Belgium and Czechoslovakia, and second, there
140 

was heavy water, which was largely imported from the Norsk Hydro plant in Norway.

Again,

while the uranium to which Germany had access in occupying those two countries was never
used for a large scale nuclear weapons project, its very existence gave the Allies reason for
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concern. The same was the case for the Norwegian heavy water. After all, even the limited
activity on nuclear weapons that Allied intelligence was observing did not convince them that the
Germans were not somehow on their way to building a bomb.
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Important, however, is the fact

that these uranium deposits and the heavy water were just the like the raw materials needed for
building rockets and jets, in that they came from abroad and needed to be imported. This meant
that once Belgium and Czechoslovakia were liberated, uranium imports were no longer
available. While the Allies could not do anything to stop uranium imports until the war was
really going against Germany, they could have an impact on the Norwegian heavy water plant,
and that is why the British Special Operations Executive planned and executed a sabotage attack
on the plant that virtually destroyed it. Granted, this was not as big of a deal because it was not
as though this really stifled Germany’s hopes for a nuclear weapon, but it might have been if
there had actually been a major atomic bomb program.
The thing that makes the nuclear weapons program different from the rocket and jets
projects of course is that comparatively it was such a small endeavor, and this is where it appears
that as far as rationality is concerned, the availability of raw materials does not really play a role
in how rational it was to not invest in a nuclear program. Despite the threat of a nuclear weapon
that the Allies perceived, the materials needed for a nuclear weapon were relatively secure and
not in short supply for most of the war. In that sense, in comparison with the other programs, it
was actually the one best suited for reliance upon imports, and it would therefore have actually
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made sense to invest in this one. But because that big investment was never made, the question
of rationality does not have to do with this aspect.

Technological Understanding
The third important factor in considering the rationality of investing in these various
programs is how well the technology was understood by those who were advocating for or
against investment. All of the programs shared the trait of being understood in theory, but the
rocket and jet scientists had an advantage over nuclear weapons, and this connects to the prewar
history of each technology. The technology of rockets was not only understood long before the
war began, but it was also actually applied in experimentation. Rocket scientists, like Wernher
von Braun, had years of testing under their belts before the first versions of the V2 were
demonstrated in the mid1930s. Because of this, there was nothing in terms of theory or
experimentation stopping the development of an effective ballistic missile. Jets were very much
the same. As a result of the rocket fad, the 
Luftwaffe
was interested in building jet aircraft, as the
technology for rockets and jet engines overlapped. In fact, much of the early work in the mid
1930s on rockets and jets was done under cooperation between the Air Force and the Army.
This meant that just like rockets, jet engines were long out of the theoretical stage by the time the
war arrived. Regardless of their quality, there were actual jet engines in testing facilities.
Nuclear weapons were only similar to the other two projects insofar as the concept of a nuclear
weapon was understood. This means that German scientists, most importantly Werner
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Heisenberg, thought that it was definitely possible to build a nuclear weapon

142

and that there

was not a lot remaining in terms of figuring out how. But the little bit that did remain was
exactly the key. The German nuclear scientists had no experience translating theory into
experimentation because the theoretical understanding had only been around since one year
before the war started. There had been no time for them to spend on gaining such experience
because the science itself was so new, and the way these scientists interpreted the science meant
that they felt the lack of such experience was reasonable. As was discussed earlier, Heisenberg
believed very early on that German nuclear engineering was at a primitive stage in knowing how
to build a nuclear weapon.
In comparing all three of the programs, it is clear that it was perfectly rational to invest in
rockets and jets given the fact that these technologies were understood and that there were results
that proved this understanding. At the same time, it was perfectly rational not to invest in
nuclear weapons given the extreme recentness of the discovery that made nuclear weapons a
very possible reality instead of just an idea and the fact that unlike the other two projects, there
was nothing, and, according to Heisenberg, would not for a long time be, to show for the
theoretical comprehension of an atomic bomb.

Management
Finally, there is the way in which each program was run. Rockets, as was mentioned
earlier, were the biggest, most extensive Nazi weapons program, and therefore had a huge
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network of managing groups. This was how Hitler ran all of his programs. He liked to “scatter
143 

responsibility,”

insisted upon oversight from different organizations, and encouraged

competition because he cared about who would get him the result he wanted. This is why the
rocket program, despite initially being a German Army initiative, was partially run by the SS
once the Mittelwerk facilities at MittelbauDora were set up, and why the 
Luftwaffe
fought the
Army over access to its rocket scientists in the mid1930s. The specific tug of war between the
Army and the 
Luftwaffe
over rocket scientists actually related to the jet program as well, and it
bred a money war between the two branches that finally resulted in Wernher von Braun and his
colleagues staying with the Army. However, the reason why both branches fought over which
rocket scientists they could convince to work for them was because they were vying for
legitimacy and priority in their efforts to acquire funding from Hitler’s government, and this sort
of infighting and lack of cooperation continued throughout the war. As far as nuclear weapons
were concerned, part of the “management” aspect was really related to the expulsion of many
prominent and brilliant scientists before the war, and their replacement by fanatical Nazis who
only ruined German science.
As was the case with the raw materials and the nuclear program, in terms of all three of
these programs, rationality is a questionable trait to assess because the management was
ultimately influenced by Hitler and Nazi politics. The rocket program had a very effective leader
in Walter Dornberger, just like Adolf Galland was a great aviation tactician and Werner
Heisenberg was the leader of German nuclear weapons science, but in the end they were all
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subject to how Hitler ran his country and his institutions. Dornberger had to deal with the SS,
favorites of Hitler of course, and high priority not being assigned to the rocket program until
1943 despite his knowledge that that status needed to come earlier. Galland was forced to accept
that Hitler wanted a jet bomber and therefore ruled out massive jet fighter fleets even though
Galland knew that the latter strategy was the one that was more realistic and might actually have
had an effect on the war. Heisenberg and Hahn and others initially had to watch Hitler change
the faces of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the Prussian Academy of Sciences, and would have
certainly faced challenges similar to those of Dornberger and Galland if the nuclear program had
been a fullfledged operation. With this in mind, how rational it was to invest in these programs
given the state of the management is really dependent upon whether or not it is seen from
Hitler’s point of view. From the perspective of someone like Dornberger, Galland, and
Heisenberg, the organization and administration of these projects was disastrous and not
conducive to a truly successful undertaking, like the Manhattan Project, for example. But from
Hitler’s view it was perfectly reasonable.

The Rationality of the Decisions Made to Invest in Exotic Weapons
During World War II, Germany put a lot of effort into battlefield technology that was
rightly considered to be the technology of the future but wrongly judged to be capable of
winning the war because of that futuristic aspect. The rocket, jet, and nuclear programs were, in
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the end, failures, because none of them achieved their overall purpose, which was to help
Germany win the war. It is easy to call such exotic weapons programs irrational given this
failure, but it is also important to understand that ideology often strongly influenced those in
charge of making the important decisions, and that the Nazi political and military leadership
viewed the war in a different light as they fought it. Therefore, in assessing how rational it was
to invest in programs that did not do what they were expected to do, the thinking of those
involved in the decisionmaking process at the time and the modern knowledge of how they had
little to no effect on the outcome of the war were considered and compared.
Of the three projects, the rocket program was probably the biggest success in terms of
how many were produced. The reason the production figures are important are because they
show that the rockets suffered from fewer technical deficiencies than the jet engines, but even
this is a bit misleading in terms of calling the rocket program successful in any sense, because
the rockets were still not wellbuilt and were really ineffective once they were deployed. Jets,
while initially a scare for Allied pilots who came up against them, proved to be nothing more
than an irrelevant glimpse of the future of aerial combat. Nuclear weapons never existed in Nazi
Germany, so whatever hopes were pinned on them were little more than a distant dream.
The question that has been asked throughout this investigation is how rational it was for
Germany to invest in these three exotic weapons programs as a way of changing the course of
the war. The answer is that it depends on various factors, such as the prewar history of each
technology, the availability of raw materials, the level of scientific understanding of the
technologies, and the way in which each program was carried out, as well on whether one looks
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at each decision in the present day or in the time in which the decision was made. But in order to
simplify this answer and provide a final analysis, it can be said that it made sense to go for exotic
weapons programs, like jets and rockets, before the war, but not during it, and that it made sense
not to invest too much in nuclear weapons given how German nuclear scientists assessed the
state of nuclear weapons research. At the same time that it was a poor decision to invest in
exotic weapons during the war, it can also be said that even if one considers the fact that the
United States built an atomic bomb, it was not a mistake not to invest in nuclear weapons either.
Even though by 1941 the science in Germany and the United States on nuclear weapons was at
the same level, the US had the advantage of its industry not constantly being under attack from
enemy countries and its economy being far more capable of handling the stresses of massive
weapons programs like the Manhattan Project. Perhaps the policy of measured investment was
the approach that should have been taken for the rocket and jet projects as well. The nuclear
program was not shut down, it was just allowed to continue at its own pace, and at a low cost.
Although by 1945 the Germans had rockets and jets and certainly wished they had a nuclear
weapon in addition, it was wise not to waste even more money and resources on such a project,
and after all, the rockets and jets didn’t even do anything anyway.
It is clear why programs like jets and rockets were suddenly cultivated during the war:
Germany ended up fighting a defensive war against enemies that became increasingly numerous
and superior. The only way, in the eyes of Hitler and many of his associates, to win the war then
was to do it with a miracle weapon: the 
Wunderwaffe
. But in following this belief, they ignored
the reality of the situation, which was that such weapons were impossible to be both improved
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and produced in enough numbers to actually change the course of the war back in Germany’s
favor. They sacrificed quality for quantity, which was not exactly something they could afford
to do given that the whole point of exotic weapons was that their quality was unrivalled by
anything Germany’s enemies had. In making the mistake to invest in such exotic programs, they
left aside far more attainable goals, such as long range bombers, that could have played a
valuable, decisive role earlier on in the campaign and perhaps prevented the need to fall back on
a
Wunderwaffe
.

